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opinion of the Fifth Circuit has a limiting effect on the protections
afforded by the first and fourteenth amendments. Because of this
limiting effect, it is suggested that the Court should have granted
certiorari and reversed the case.
RONALD D. POLTORACK
Fisher v. First National Bank of Chicago: 12
U.S.C. Section 85 Is Granted Automatic
Extraterritorial Effect
This note discusses the operation of the Seventh Circuit's hold-
ing that pursuant to 12 U.S. C. section 85 a national bank located in
Illinois may apply that state's interest rates in any other state.
Through an economic analysis, the author argues that this operation
is essentially sound but should be modified to permit the considera-
tion of conflicts of law principles. The operation of the exception to
this general rule is also considered. Specific attention is given to the
application and effects of the words "located" and "existing" as used
in section 85.
Fisher, an Iowa resident,' brought an action against the First
National Bank of Chicago, chartered in Illinois, alleging that the
interest charged in connection with its bank credit cards was usu-
rious under Iowa law. In Fisher v. First National Bank of Chicago2
the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the
District Court for the Northern District of Illinois3 to dismiss the
1. In June, 1969, plaintiff Fred Fisher ("Fisher"), a resident of Iowa, received a
credit card from The First National Bank of Chicago ("Bank"), a national banking
association located in Chicago, Illinois. Fisher accepted the card and used it numerous
times to obtain credit from the Bank pursuant to the terms of the agreement that was
enclosed with the card when he received it.
Brief for appellee at 2. (References to appendix omitted.)
2. 538 F.2d 1284 (7th Cir. 1976), cert: denied, 97 S. Ct. 786 (1977).
3. This action . . . was originally filed in the United States District Court for the
Southern District of Iowa on September 3, 1971 ...
On May 9, 1972, on the Bank's motion, the district court dismissed the complaint
for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Fisher requested reconsideration of that ruling
and also sought leave to file an amended complaint. ...
On June 14, 1972, the district court denied Fisher's motion for reconsideration,
and, on July 5, 1972, denied his motion for leave to amend the complaint. On appeal,
the district court's jurisdictional ruling was reversed (6-2) by the Court of Appeals for
the Eighth Circuit sitting en banc, and the case was remanded with instructions that
Fisher be allowed to file his amended complaint. 479 F.2d 26 (8th Cir. 1973).
On remand, the district court took up the Bank's motion for a change of venue
pursuant to Section 94 of the National Bank Act, 12 U.S.C. § 94, and on February 14,
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action for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
The Seventh Circuit held that where a national bank is located in
Illinois and charging interest in Iowa, the allowable rate of interest
under 12 U.S.C. section 85' is provided by Illinois law.
I. INTRODUCTION
First National Bank of Chicago is located in Illinois but offers
its credit card services in Iowa through local correspondent banks.
In so doing, the bank charges the eighteen percent annual interest
allowed by the Illinois Revolving Credit Act.' Iowa law, however,
allows interest rates ranging between twelve percent and thirty-six
percent for small loan companies' but only twelve percent for state
banks.7 Fisher brought a class action on behalf of himself and all
other persons within the state of Iowa who were customers of de-
fendant's First Card and Bank Americard plans and who had un-
paid balances in their accounts within two years of the filing of his
complaint. The complaint alleged that the eighteen percent interest
rate of defendant's revolving credit card plan was usurious under
the Iowa law which allows state banks only twelve percent. The
statutory basis of the complaint was two sections of the National
Bank Act, 12 U.S.C. section 858 and section 86.1
Section 85 sets forth the allowable rate of interest for national
banks and provides in pertinent part:
Any association may take, receive, reserve, and charge on any loan
or discount made, or upon any notes, bills of exchange, or other
evidences of debt, interest at the rate allowed by the laws of the
State, Territory, or District where the bank is located . . . except
that where by the laws of any State a different rate is limited for
banks organized under State laws, the rate so limited shall be allowed
for associations organized or existing in any such State under this
chapter. (Emphasis added).
1974, the court granted the motion and ordered the case to be transferred to the
Northern District of Illinois.
Brief for appellee at 3, 4. (References to appendix omitted.)
12 U.S.C. § 94 (1970) is the venue provision of the National Bank Act, and provides that
suits against national banking associations "may be had in any district . . . court of the
United States held within the district in which such association may be established, or in
any State . . . court in the county or city in which said association is located ....
4. (Supp. V 1975). See note 8, infra.
5. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 74, § 4.2 (1973). "The rate charged by the Bank . . . was 1 1/2%
per month of the average daily unpaid balance of the principal of Fisher's debt during the
billing cycle. . . ." Brief for appellee at 7.
6. IowA CODE ANN. § 536.13(4)(5) (West 1970).
7. IOWA CODE ANN. § 524.906(1)(b) (West 1970).
8. This section establishes the rates of interest a national bank may charge.
9. This section fixes the penalty for usury.
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The intendment of this section is to limit a national bank's interest
rate to that of the state in which it is located. Hence, the importance
of Fisher rests with its determination of which interest rate a na-
tional bank may charge in a state where it is not located.
The Seventh Circuit's interpretation of section 85 applies the
section's general rule that the state in which a national bank is
located provides the interest rate the bank may charge.'" According
to the Fisher court, this rule applies even when national banks
charge interest, or make loans, in states where they are not located.
On the other hand, the exception to the rule provides that when a
national bank "exists" in a state, it may charge the rate that state
allows to banks chartered under its laws. Therefore, the Seventh
Circuit held that the First National Bank of Chicago may charge the
eighteen percent Illinois rate in Iowa because it is located in Illi-
nois." Furthermore, the court indicated that if the defendant bank
had existed in Iowa it could charge the interest rate applicable to
the Iowa state banks, should that rate be higher than the Illinois
rate.'I
This note will first analyze the effects and implications of the
Seventh Circuit's holding. It then will proceed to explore the pecu-
liar problems raised by the court's treatment of the terms "located"
and "existing." In this regard, one will observe that the court's
application of section 85 hinges upon the recognized, but still unde-
fined, distinction between the aforementioned terms. As the lan-
guage of the section indicates, the operational effect of the general
rule depends upon the definition of "located" whereas the excep-
tion's effect depends upon the meaning ascribed to "existing."
II. Fisher's GENERAL RULE: ITS PROBLEMS AND IMPLICATIONS
Fisher's general rule is derived from a literal interpretation of
the section's broad language. As mentioned previously, section 85
10. 538 F.2d at 1291.
11. This holding rejects the positions of both the district court below and the district
court in Meadowbrook National Bank v. Recile, 302 F. Supp. 62 (E.D. La. 1969) vacated,
No. 67-341 (E.D. La. Nov. 24, 1969). The Northern District of Illinois had asserted that the
borrower's state should limit the chargeable interest rate, but it justified the defendant's
eighteen percent rate with the "most favored lender" doctrine. The court found that since
Iowa law applied, and the amount loaned Fisher never exceeded $1,000, the defendant bank's
eighteen percent interest rate was permitted by the Iowa small loan act. 539 F.2d 1287-88. In
Meadowbrook, the court asserted that the borrower's state should provide the allowable
interest rate because the National Bank Act "fixes the rate of interest chargeable by a
national bank only as to loans made in the state where the bank is located." 302 F. Supp. at
75. Meadowbrook has been criticized in Shanks, Special Usury Problems Applicable to Na-
tional Banks, 87 BANK. L.J. 483, 491 n.14 (1970).
12. 538 F.2d at 1291 (Dictum).
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states that the law of the state where the bank is located shall
provide the allowable rate of interest on "any loan."' 3 Thus, it is not
inconsistent to interpret "any loan" as including loans made either
in other states or made in-state but to out-of-state residents.
Although deciding that the broad statutory language supported
its holding, the court neglected to discuss the implications that
would result. This is an especially curious aspect of Fisher in view
of the extraterritorial effect granted Illinois' interest rates, which
raises three principle considerations. First, providing extraterrito-
rial effect to the interest rates of one forum may offend the interest
policies of another forum. In Fisher, for example, the Illinois interest
rate, when applied in Iowa, subverted the Iowa policy that no one
shall borrow from a bank at more than twelve percent interest. As
interpreted by the Seventh Circuit, however, a national bank may
always have this option of charging the interest rate allowed by the
state in which it is located, regardless of the policies of other af-
fected forums.
Next, the question arises whether or not Illinois national banks
gain an unfair competitive advantage over Iowa state banks. It is
submitted herein, that when an Illinois national bank charges eigh-
teen percent in Iowa, there accrues no competitive advantage over
Iowa state banks which are limited to twelve percent." Briefly, this
assertion rests with the view that, in this situation, national and
state banks are functioning in different markets, and therefore are
not competing. As will be demonstrated, economic analysis will
justify this statement.
It is commonly understood that interest rates and the amount
of money sought to be borrowed are inversely proportional. As a
general rule, when interest rates rise the demand for loans will de-
crease and, conversely, more loans will be demanded as interest
rates decline. Although more people will want to borrow at lower
interest rates, banks will not necessarily lend to all who wish to
borrow. The interest rate at which a bank will lend depends, inter
alia, on the risks 5 a particular borrower presents. A twelve percent
usury law limits the bank's operational market by permitting it to
compete for only those borrowers whose risks require no more than
a twelve percent rate. The bank is prohibited by law from competing
13. See text following note 9.
14. A national bank's ability to charge higher interest rates may provide a greater oppor-
tunity for success and profits. This does not affect, however, the existence of competitive
advantage. Throughout this article competitive advantage shall refer to the comparative
ability of different money lenders to supply the same market.
15. A. ALCHIAN & W. ALLEN, UNIVERSITY ECONOMICS, 470-72 (3d ed. 1972).
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for higher risk borrowers who can only obtain loans at eighteen
percent interest.16
Markets are defined by this conjunction of borrowers' risks and
usury laws. Because of the bank's desire to earn profits, it is pre-
cluded from making loans to higher risk borrowers at lower interest
rates. 1 Therefore, in the principal case, Iowa state banks are not
competing in that market where borrowers' higher risks justify in-
terest rates from twelve percent to eighteen percent. Higher risk
borrowers who can only borrow at greater than twelve percent must
either borrow from a non-Iowa bank or do without the loan. Not-
withstanding this division of markets, Illinois national banks, doing
business in Iowa, would be competing with Iowa banks for those
borrowers whose risks justify no more than twelve percent. In this
competitive situation, Iowa banks will have a competitive advan-
tage since they will not incur the higher transaction costs caused by
lending money in foreign markets. 8
Illinois national banks will only be able to lend at interest rates
greater than twelve percent if one of two conditions precedent are
met. First, the higher risk Iowa residents must demand loans, in
other words, the market for loans at interest rates greater than
twelve percent must exist. 9 Second, Iowa banks must have loaned
out all their assets, thereby leaving out-of-state banks as the only
source of loans. This resultant scarcity of money would cause inter-
16. Id.
17. Id. at 466-67.
18. "A law restricting the class of borrowers to whom banks can lend, or the interest they
can charge, does not prevent banks from competing with each other in other cost-incurring
services in order to lend." Id. at 471.




P represents the interest rate, and Q, the amount of loans demanded at each P. D is the
demand curve for loans of Iowa residents. S is the supply curve of loans made available by
Iowa and Illinois banks. In this example, there is a demand for loans at an interest rate greater
than twelve percent which is not being met because of Iowa usury law. Since this demand is
not met, a market exists for Illinois banks to charge eighteen percent interest. At the twelve
percent rate, Q' represents the amount of money loaned. Q" represents the amount loaned
at eighteen percent. The difference between Q" and Q' (the shaded area) represents the
amount of money loaned to those borrowers whose risks require an interest rate greater than
twelve percent. Only if the supply and demand curves intersect above the twelve percent
interest rate will the Illinois banks have a market for loans over twelve percent.
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est rates to rise independently of individual borrowers' risks.2" Thus,
given either of these two conditions, Fisher guarantees Illinois na-
tional banks a new market in Iowa contrary to Iowa policy, but not
to the detriment of Iowa banks.
The third consideration raised by the extraterritorial operation
of Illinois usury law is the automatic effect given the Illinois eigh-
teen percent rate by the Seventh Circuit. The court held that
"Illinois' 18% per annum statute applies to all loans made by the
defendant Illinois national banking association, whether made in
Illinois or elsewhere .... ,,21 It is submitted that this holding is
unnecessarily broad.
Section 85 provides that a national bank may charge interest
"at the rate allowed by the laws of the State . . ." where it is
located.22 The word "laws" is not limited to a state's statutory usury
law. In First National Bank in Mena v. Nowlin,23 it was argued that
the interest rates allowed to national banks were provided only by
the numerical rate of interest permitted by state statute and did not
include the state case law construing that statute. The court dis-




P represents the interest rates, and Q the amount of loans demanded at each P. D is the
demand curve for loans of Iowa residents. S' is the supply curve of loans made available by
Iowa and Illinois banks where the banks of both states have sufficient excess reserves to meet
the demand of lower risk Iowa residents. As in this example, however, if the excess reserves
of the Iowa banks decrease, ceteris paribus, the supply curve will shift upward and to the
left, thereby establishing a new equilibrium point (E"). At the old equilibrium point (E')
there was no demand by low risk Iowa residents for loans at interest rates greater than twelve
percent. After the shift in the supply curve, however, Illinois banks will be able to make loans
to low risk Iowa residents at interest rates greater than twelve percent. The difference between
Q" and Q.' (the shaded area) represents the amount of such loans. The interest rate charged
(P in this example) can be as high as eighteen percent, and the increase is unrelated to
individual borrowers' risks.
21. 538 F.2d at 1291. (Emphasis in original).
22. 12 U.S.C. § 85 (Supp. V 1975). (Emphasis added).
23. 509 F.2d 872 (8th Cir. 1975).
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agreed, and held that where state case law has declared that it is
usurious for a state association to discount interest rates it is also
usurious for a national bank to engage in such discounting. The
Eighth Circuit replied that section 85 "adopts the entire case law
of the state interpreting the state's limitations on usury. ... 1
This decision sought to avoid a situation where although both state
and national banks are limited by the same statutory rate, national
banks could have obtained a higher "effective rate" or "yield" by
discounting. 5 The result essentially was founded upon the stated
policy of maintaining competitive equality between state and fed-
eral lending associations.
The Middle District of Alabama has also articulated this notion
of competitive equality in Partain v. First National Bank.27 Therein
the court interpreted the "most favored lender" doctrine first artic-
ulated in Tiffany v. First National Bank of Missouri." In Tiffany,
Missouri allowed two interest rates: ten percent for persons gener-
ally and eight percent for state banks. The First National Bank of
Missouri charged nine percent and it was argued that this rate was
usurious since national banks were limited by the rate established
for state banks. The Court disagreed and held that national banks
were not limited by the rate provided exclusively for state banks.
National banks may charge the highest rates allowed by the state
to its most favored lenders; since persons generally could charge ten
percent, national banks may charge up to ten percent. The Court
reasoned that otherwise national banks could be placed at a com-
petitive disadvantage in relation to state most favored lenders.29 As
discussed previously,30 this is an inaccurate characterization. There
is no competitive disadvantage to national banks if nonbanking
persons may charge ten percent whereas national banks are limited
to eight percent. In this situation the two lenders cannot compete
24. Id. at 876.
25. When interest is discounted, the stated interest rate is deducted from the amount
borrowed before the borrower receives the. loan. The borrower then repays the face amount
of the loan. Discounting results in a higher than stated interest rate. For example, if $100 is
borrowed for one year at 5 percent interest, at the end of the year $100 plus 5 percent, or $5,
would be repayed. However, if the 5 percent were discounted, the borrower would receive $95
and repay $100 in one year. In the first case, the borrower is paying $5 for the use of $100;
but in the second case, he is paying $5 for the use of $95. When the $5 is discounted, the
interest rate exceeds 5 1/4 percent annually.
26. 509 F.2d at 879-80.
27. 336 F. Supp. 65 (M.D. Ala. 1971), rev'd on other grounds, 467 F.2d 167 (5th Cir.
1972).
28. 85 U.S. 409 (1873).
29. Id. at 412-13.
30. See text accompanying notes 14 to 20.
19771
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
for those borrowers whose risks require interest rates from eight to
ten percent. Tiffany's most favored lender doctrine more accurately
may be viewed as promoting competition between national banks
and nonbank state lending institutions. In order to compete with the
state's most favored lenders, national banks may charge the interest
rates allowed these lenders. This characterization is helpful in un-
derstanding the subsequent decisions of the Partain and Nowlin
courts.
In Partain, it was held that a national bank may charge the
thirty-six percent rate allowed to small loan companies even though
the bank did not fulfill the statutory requirements for such compa-
nies.3' However, the bank was permitted only to apply the small
loan rate to small loans-those defined by the statute as less than
three hundred dollars. The court reasoned that national banks may
charge as much as competing institutions, but only for those types
of loans which competing institutions are permitted to make. Thus,
a necessary evolution of the most favored lender doctrine occurred.
Whereas Tiffany allows national banks to compete with most fa-
vored lenders by charging the higher most favored lender interest
rates, Partain limits the doctrine to its intended purpose of competi-
tive equality. Thus, a more accurate statement of the policy would
be that national banks may only use most favored lender rates to
compete with lenders permitted to charge those rates.
Both Nowlin and Partain state that the foundation for their
decisions is competitive equality. Their analytical frameworks focus
on the existence of competitive advantages. In both cases the courts
took limitations on state lenders and applied them to federal lenders
in order to prevent the federal lenders from effectively charging
higher interest rates. It is suggested that this does not literally main-
tain competitive equality or competitive advantage but rather the
existence of competition. When only national banks are permitted
to charge high interest rates, they are the only lenders operating in
those markets composed of high risk borrowers.
In Nowlin, if national banks could discount the maximum in-
terest rate, they could lend to higher risk borrowers because state
lenders, prohibited from discounting, would be unable to compete.
A similar situation existed in Partain. If national banks could
charge thirty-six percent on any loan, they could function in innu-
merable high risk markets foreclosed to all other state lenders.
Partain and Nowlin would not interpret section 85 to allow a na-
tional bank higher interest rates than every state lender. Implicit in
31. 336 F. Supp. at 67. See also 538 F.2d at 1288.
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this prohibition is the requirement that for every interest rate al-
lowed to national banks there exist state lenders who are also al-
lowed those rates. It is submitted that when determining "the rate
allowed by the laws of the state . . ." the courts should analyze
whether or not the rate in question will result in national banks
operating as the only lenders in the given market. Any rate which
allows national banks to operate in a market absent the competition
of state lenders should not be "the rate allowed by the laws of the
State . .. 3 as permitted by section 85. Thus, the Nowlin-Partain
notion of competitive equality should be characterized as the oppor-
tunity for the lenders organized under the laws of the state where
the national bank is located, to compete with that national bank.
In essence, this statement is simply the converse of the principle set
forth in Tiffany; that is, national banks may compete with all state
lending institutions.
Given this perspective of section 85, the automatic nature of the
rule provided by the Fisher court can be analyzed. The Seventh
Circuit's opinion could be interpreted as stating that national banks
may charge in any state, the rate allowed by the state where it is
located. This interpretation is undesirable because it would produce
a result rejected by the Nowlin and Partain courts. Thus, a national
bank could make loans at rates prohibited to all state lenders rather
than simply at rates forbidden to state banks. This effect would be
caused by the failure to consider conflict of laws principles which,
though non-uniform in their approach, govern the rates a state bank
may charge when lending in a foreign forum.3"
The Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws34 provides a lib-
eral principle. A rate of interest will not be found usurious if it is
permitted by a state to which the contract has a substantial rela-
tionship, and if the rate is not greatly in excess of the rate permitted
by the otherwise applicable law. Leflar concurs with the Restate-
ment: "The courts tend to apply the law of whatever state, substan-
tially connected with the transaction, will sustain the contract, un-
less the contract somehow violates the forum's strong public pol-
icy."' 35 Ehrenzweig finds that this liberal principle applies to con-
tracts generally but does not ordinarily apply to usurious con-
32. 12 U.S.C. § 85 (Supp. V 1975).
33. See Seaman v. Philadelphia Warehouse Co., 274 U.S. 403 (1927); Speare v. Consoli-
dated Assets Corp., 367 F.2d 208 (2d Cir. 1966); Clarkson v. Finance Co., 328 F.2d 404 (4th
Cir. 1964).
34. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 203 (1971).
35. R. LEFLAR, AMERICAN CONFLICTS OF LAW § 153 at 378-79 (1968). Both Leflar and the
Restatement, supra note 34, comment (c) find support for this proposition in 2 BEALE, CON-
FLICT OF LAWS, 1241-42 (1935), and GOODRICH, CONFLICT OF LAWS, 216-19 (4th ed. 1964).
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tracts."6 Stumberg37 notes and approves what is in substance the
Restatement rule. He further catalogs three other principles: (1) the
law where the contract was made controls; (2) the law of the place
of performance controls; and (3) the contract will not be usurious if
it is sustained under the law of the place of making or the place of
performance.
Depending on which conflict of laws principle a particular
forum applies, a state bank doing business in another state may or
may not be guilty of usury. If the rule in Fisher is automatic, how-
ever, national banks may charge the rates allowed by the state
where they are located for all loans regardless of this consideration.
Therefore, it is merely fortuitous that a state bank will have the
same access as national banks located in its state, with respect to
potential out-of-state markets. This is precisely the result the
Nowlin and Partain courts sought to avoid - national banks operat-
ing by themselves in a particular market.
This problem can be avoided if future interpretations of section
85 ("rate allowed by the laws of the State . . .") consider the word
"laws" to include state conflicts of law rules. In this respect,
Nowlin can easily be read as supporting this contention." By sub-
jecting national banks to state conflicts law, we mitigate the effect
of the two problems mentioned above, which are created by the
Fisher court's automatic general rule. First, state and national
banks located in the same state will be subject to the same con-
straints on their ability to compete in out-of-state markets. This
would comport with the notions of competition set forth in Nowlin
and Partain. Second, conflicts principles may also allow the courts
to give some consideration to a state whose policies may otherwise
be subordinated. As specifically permitted by the Restatement,'40
and noted by Leflar,4" a more liberal rate will not be allowed in a
state whose strong public policy is offended. If in Fisher a strong
Iowa policy was manifest, conflicts rules would not have subordi-
nated that policy so as to permit Illinois law to control the transac-
tion. To the extent conflicts principles are uncertain or unpredicta-
ble, however, they may cause higher transaction costs when operat-
ing in foreign markets.,2
36. A. EHRENZWEIG, CONFLICT OF LAW, § 182 (1962). He does note, however, exceptions
where the liberal law of another state has been used to uphold an otherwise usurious contract.
37. G. STUMBERG, PRINCIPLE OF CONFLICTS OF LAW, at 237-39 (3d ed. 1963).
38. Shanks, supra note 11 at 489.
39. See text accompanying notes 23 & 24.
40. See note 34 and accompanying text supra.
41. See note 35 supra.
42. The value of property rights depends upon their legal enforceability. As people come
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Conflicts principles should apply as long as the general rule,
controls. When the "exception clause" is invoked the national bank
should be permitted to charge the higher rate allowed by the state
in which it exists. Unlike the general rule, the operation of the
"exception clause" does not defeat any policy considerations. The
higher rate is endorsed by the state where the national bank exists
and it will be competing with that state's lenders.
A. Problems with Location
In order to apply Fisher's general rule, the location of the na-
tional bank must be determined. A large body of case law has devel-
oped through 12 U.S.C. section 94, the venue provision of the Na-
tional Bank Act, for determining where national banks are located.
The Seventh Circuit relied on cases interpreting section 94 in its
finding that the defendant bank was located in Illinois for the pur-
poses of section 85.11 In this regard, the general rule relied on by the
court is that a national bank is located where it is established" and
it is established at the location of its main branch as specified in
its charter or organization certificate.45 Until recently, this rule was
unqualified by almost every federal court and it still remains the
majority position.46 Only one state court has dissented from this
position.47
If the majority definition of location continues to prevail and
is applied to section 85, an interesting effect will result. A national
bank located in Illinois with branches in several states which have
lower interest rates will be permitted to charge Illinois interests
rates because of the location of the main branch. Certainly, such a
practice would be inconsistant with the notions of competitive
equality discussed previously. Although these branches would have
no competitive advantage over a lending association chartered by
the state where they exist and do business,4" they would have com-
petitive advantages over state institutions chartered by the state
to expect the uncertainty of a right's legal enforcement, its value will decline. ALCHIAN &
ALLEN, supra note 15, at 141-44.
43. 538 F.2d at 1289.
44. Id. at 1286.
45. Id.
46. First Nat'l Bank v. United States Dist. Ct., 468 F.2d 190 (9th Cir. 1972). Leonardi
v. Chase Nat'l Bank, 81 F.2d 19 (2d Cir. 1936), cert. denied, 298 U.S. 677; Odette v. Shearson,
Hammill & Co., 394 F. Supp. 946 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); General Elec. Credit Corp. v. James
Talcott, Inc., 271 F. Supp. 699 (S.D.N.Y. 1966); International Refugee Organization v. Bank
of America Nat'l Trust & Say. Ass'n., 86 F. Supp. 884 (S.D.N.Y. 1949).
47. Holson v. Gosnell, 264 S.C. 619, 216 S.E.2d 539 (1975).
48. See text accompanying notes 14 to 20.
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where their main branch is located. A branch existing in a state will
incur smaller costs per loan than a bank located in another state and
trying to do business across state lines. An Iowa resident whose
credit-worthiness requires an over twelve percent loan might have
incurred the costs of going to Illinois to borrow from either a state
or national bank. Under the Fisher rule, however, this Iowa resident
can go to a branch of an Illinois national bank in Iowa-therein lies
the competitive advantage.
III. THE EXCEPTION TO THE GENERAL RULE: PROBLEMS AND
IMPLICATIONS
Fisher's interpretation of the "exception clause"" assures na-
tional banks the option of charging the highest possible interest
rate. Provided it exists or is located in a state, it may charge the rate
allowed to that state's banks. This exception will become relevant
when the state in which the national bank exists permits higher
interest rates than the state in which it is located.
A. The Problem of "Existing"
First National Bank of Chicago was operating a credit card
service in Iowa through local correspondent banks. Such credit card
systems are found throughout the United States. Consumers enter
into contracts with the credit card issuer, who has previously en-
tered into contracts with various merchants.5 When the consumer
purchases an item with the card he does not pay the merchant;
instead, the merchant tenders the sales slip to the issuer and it bills
the consumer."2 In the instant case the system involved more than
three parties. Here the merchants tender the sales slips to local
corresponding banks, which in turn forward the sales slips to the
card issuer in Illinois.
The ability of the defendant bank to charge a higher Iowa rate
would depend on whether or not the bank exists in Iowa. The Fisher
court found it unnecessary to make this determination but stated
49. The "exception clause" of section 85 provides: "[E]xcept that where by the laws of
any State a different rate is limited for banks organized under State laws, the rate so limited
shall be allowed for associations organized or existing in any such State under this chapter."
See text accompanying note 53.
50. See generally Brandel and Leonard, Bank Charge Cards: New Cash or New Credit,
69 MICH. L. REV. 1033 (1971); Davenport, Bank Credit Cards and the Uniform Commercial
Code, 1 VAL. U. L. REV. 218 (1967); Note, Regulation of Installment Credit Cards, 35 U. CIN.
L. REV. 424 (1966); Comment, The Tripartite Credit Card Transaction: A Legal Infant, 48
CAL. L. REV. 459 (1960).
51. Brandel and Leonard, supra note 50 at 1035; Comment, supra note 50 at 464.
52. Brandel and Leonard, supra note 50 at 1035.
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"the defendant bank appears to exist in Iowa."53 "Existing" was
defined as "the fact, or state, of being or living" 4 but was neither
explained nor applied to the facts. Thus, a narrow interpretation of
the Seventh Circuit's suggestion that the First National Bank of
Chicago exists in Iowa is that the act of an Iowa resident possessing
and using that bank's credit card, and the existence of the process-
ing system among merchants, corresponding banks and card issuer,
are sufficient to find that the card issuer exists in Iowa.
A narrower definition of "existing" would serve to limit the
ability of national banks to implement the higher interest rates of
other states. Some limitation upon the effect of this term is neces-
sary since it is susceptible to broad interpretation in two contexts.
First, in any loan situation possibly five different forums may be-
come relevant: lender's state, borrower's state, state where the con-
tract is entered into, state where the contract is to be performed,
and state(s) where negotiations occur. In a credit card situation the
potential forums are limited by the number of states where the cards
are honored. Every such state will contain an interchange system55
of corresponding banks which transfers sales slips from merchants
to card issuers. Hence, a bank, especially a credit card issuer, can
possibly "exist" in many states under Fisher's analysis. Merely
doing business in a state would be a threshold requirement for exist-
ence, but it should not be a necessary or sufficient criteria. The
residency of one party to the transaction, for example, may provide
an appropriate limit. In the instant case Fisher's Iowa residency
conjoined with the credit card system could be sufficient to find that
defendant bank existed in Iowa. On the other hand, if Fisher merely
had used his card in Indiana, the Illinois bank should not be found
to exist there simply because a system for processing credit card
transactions operates in the state.
Furthermore, the "exception clause" imposes no limitation on
its own general effect. If any state provides a different rate for state
banks, then that rate is allowed to national banks existing in the
state. A literal interpretation would permit a national bank to
charge the higher rate allowed by the state where it exists to all
other transactions without regard to who the parties are, or where
the transaction is negotiated, consummated and performed. For
example, an Illinois national bank existing in Iowa could charge a
higher Iowa rate in Illinois and anywhere else it existed. Since Iowa
53. 538 F.2d at 1291.
54. Id. at n.12.
55. Brandel and Leonard, supra note 52 at 1036.
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banks could be charging the higher rates in these states under con-
flicts law, an Illinois national bank might argue that it should be
able to implement the Iowa rates in order to compete with Iowa
banks in these out-of-state markets. As is apparent, at this point the
"exception clause" would begin to swallow the general rule of sec-
tion 85 and tend to defeat the notion that the state where the na-
tional bank is located shall provide allowable interest rates.
B. The "Exception Clause" and the "Most Favored Lender"
Doctrine
Strict adherence to the general rule, as set forth by the Seventh
Circuit, would allow an Illinois national bank to charge Illinois
"most favored lender" rates on any appropriate loan no matter
where it was made. The language of the "exception clause" would
not support the use of higher Iowa "most favored lender" rates by
Illinois national banks, even if they existed in Iowa. The exception
clause provides in pertinent part: except that where "a different rate
is limited for banks organized under state law . . ."' the rate so
limited shall be allowed to national banks. (Emphasis added).
Hence, the limited "exception clause" literally applies to limited
rates set for banks only, not carte blanche to all lending institutions.
It has no application to rates established for nonbank lending asso-
ciations.
This apparent inconsistency in federal policy may not be ex-
plicable. As originally passed, the exception clause read: "[E]xcept
that where by the laws of any state a different rate is limited for
banks of issue organized under state laws, the rate so limited shall
be allowed for associations organized in any such state under this
act."57 This is exactly as the clause reads today except that the
words "or existing" were subsequently inserted between "orga-
nized" and "under".A During the Congressional debates concern
was expressed that if the interest rates allowed national banks
were left to state law, individual states may attempt to discriminate
against national banks by providing one rate for them and a higher
rate for state banks." Subsequent to that debate, section 85 was
rewritten and enacted as described above." It must be more than
56. 12 U.S.C. § 85 (Supp. V 1975).
57. National Bank Act, Ch. 106, § 30, 13 Stat. 99 at 108 (1864).
58. 538 F.2d at 1289.
59. Remarks of Senators Sherman and Grimes, Cong. Globe, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 2124-
25 (1864).
60. Remark of Senator Sherman, Id. at 2145.
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coincidental that the exception clause, as originally enacted, reme-
died the stated apprehension.
The "exception clause" was quoted by the Supreme Court in
its original form until 1875.1 The words "or existing" first appeared
in the Revised Statutes of 1878 section 5197 and were first cited in
1881.62 This amendment enabled the Seventh Circuit in Fisher, to
give national banks the option of charging the higher interest rates
provided by the states where they exist. Until the amendment, the
exception clause only applied to the state where the national bank
was organized.
Since there does not appear to be any legislative history for this
amendment, its purpose is left to conjecture. Apparently, it was
intended to increase the number of situations where the "exception
clause" applies. It is not clear whether or not the amendment oc-
curred prior to, or after Tiffany's promulgation of the "most favored
lender" doctrine. 3 If the amendment preceded Tiffany, it could be
argued that the "exception clause" could not possibly embrace the
"most favored lender" doctrine because it did not exist at the time
of amendment. If, however, the amendment followed Tiffany, it
could be argued that since the language only mentions banks there
was an intention to exclude the "most favored lender" doctrine from
the operation of the exception clause.
There are several good reasons why the "most favored lender"
doctrine should operate within the "exception clause." Allowing
national banks access to one state rate and not the others is incon-
sistent and arbitrary. In order to defend this result one would have
to argue that Congress intended to protect a state's "most favored
lenders" from the competition of out-of-state national banks. This
is a weak position as it has never been the intent of Congress to
shield any state institutions from the competition of national banks.
Moreover, the underlying intent of the "most favored lender" doc-
trine is to permit national banks to compete with nonbank state
lending institutions. 4 An Illinois national bank implementing the
61. 538 F.2d at 1291 n.11.
62. Id.
63. The amendment occurred between June 3, 1864, the day the National Bank Act
passed, and March 2, 1877, the current date of the Revised Statutes of 1878. Furthermore, it
has been noted that many errors were made in the compilation of the Revised Statutes.
Recently, Justice Blackman argued this possibility in a dissenting opinion involving section
91 of the National Bank Act. Third National Bank in Nashville v. Impac Limited, Inc., 97
S.Ct. 2307 (1977).
64. E.g., Tiffany v. National Bank of Missouri, 85 U.S. 409 (1873); First Nat'l Bank in
Mena v. Nowlin,. 509 F.2d 872 (8th Cir. 1975); Partain v. First Nat'l Bank, 336 F. Supp. 65
(M.D. Ala. 1971) rev'd on other grounds, 467 F.2d 167 (5th Cir. 1972).
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higher rates allowed to Iowa "most favored lenders" would not of-
fend Iowa public policy. It would be charging rates endorsed by the
state. The resulting competition between out-of-state national
banks and local "most favored lenders" may benefit local consum-
ers by reducing interest rates. Therefore, in order to give effect to
Congressional policy, at no expense to state policy, the literal provi-
sions of section 85 should be read to permit the implementation of
"most favored lender" rates through the "exception clause."
V. CONCLUSION
The Seventh Circuit has formulated the most tempting of all
rules - one that is simple and straightforward to apply. Two poten-
tial problems may be anticipated, however, because the words
"located" and "existing" are susceptible to broad interpretations.
Serious policy considerations will arise if some limitation is not
placed on their operational effect for the purposes of section 85.
One may criticize Fisher's general rule on two grounds. An
automatic application of Illinois law may create inconsistency with
the Nowlin/Partain notion of competitive equality. This difficulty
may be circumvented, however, through the application of conflicts
principles. In order to derive its general rule, the court found sup-
port in the literal interpretation of the statute. Specifically, full
effect was given to the language "any loans." An analogous effect
should be derived from the literal interpretation of "laws of the state
. .. ."This interpretation should include state conflicts law.
Those parts of section 85 which have been discussed above read
substantially the same as they were first enacted in 1864. One might
suspect that the section is an anachronism, ripe for amendment. It
is submitted that by implementing conflicts law a reasonable vehi-
cle for dealing with the extraterritorial operation of national banks
will arise.
JOSEPH L. RAIA
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